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Summary:  Student loan debt and defaults have been steadily rising, igniting public worry about 
the associated public and private risks. This has led to controversial attempts to curb defaults by 
holding colleges, particularly those in the for-profit sector, increasingly accountable for the student loan 
repayment behavior of their students. These efforts attempt to protect taxpayers against the misuse of 
public money used to encourage college enrollment and to safeguard students against potentially risky 
human capital investments. Recent policy proposals penalize colleges for students’ poor repayment 
performance, raising questions about institutions’ power to influence this behavior. Extant research 
does not conclusively establish a causal link between type of college and loan default. Available 
evidence, moreover, suggests that student demographics and family financial resources are related to 
default. As a result, policies targeting schools where students default on loans at high rates may 
disproportionately affect the postsecondary decisions of certain categories of students, such as low-
income, minority, and financially independent students. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of 
promoting the efficient use of public funds and protecting students while also encouraging access to 
higher education.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, student loan borrowing and default rates have risen notably, leading to 
concern about the public financial risks associated with loan defaults and the financial challenges 
faced by many students. These trends juxtapose with a sizable and increasing public investment in 
postsecondary education. Of late, the United States government has disbursed over $170 billion in 
financial aid annually in an effort to encourage students to attend postsecondary education. Such 
funding is supported by research that consistently finds positive and growing average economic 
benefits of college, including higher wages and lower unemployment rates (e.g., Avery & Turner, 
2012; Kane & Rouse, 1995). Higher education can also benefit society more broadly; college 
graduates are associated with higher levels of civic participation and charitable giving, less criminal 
activity, and more productive communities (Moretti, 2004; Wolfe & Haveman, 2002).  
The rationale for promoting college completion remains strong, but there is increasing 
awareness that where students attend and how they pay matters. The oft-asked question of whether 
college is “worth it”
1 has recently taken on tacit subtexts: are particular colleges worth it for certain 
students? This more nuanced question is driven, at least in part, by the rise of the proprietary college 
sector. This sector has experienced remarkable enrollment growth over the past decade and now 
accounts for a substantial proportion of postsecondary enrollment, especially at the sub-
baccalaureate level. For-profit colleges accounted for 9% of postsecondary enrollment, 19% of 
associate degrees, and 46% of certificates in 2009, up from 3%, 13%, and 39% respectively in 2000 
(Baum & Payea, 2011; Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012; National Center for Education Statistics, 
2010).  
Advocates of for-profit education connect the sector’s growing enrollment rates to the use 
of innovative program delivery mechanisms and vocationally relevant offerings that attract new 
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students to higher education (e.g., Bellin, 2013). For-profits are also poised to absorb students from 
public colleges that are capacity constrained because of budget shortfalls (e.g., Keller, 2011). Critics, 
however, have questioned the quality of educational program offerings at some for-profit schools 
and have requested reconsideration of the use of public funds to encourage enrollment in the sector 
(e.g., U.S. Committee on Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 2012). Some of this 
concern stems from documented cases of misleading or even fraudulent recruiting practices (e.g., 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). These reports have led some public officials to want 
to eliminate the “bad apples” among for-profit colleges (e.g., Fuller, 2010). Wider-ranging worries, 
however, originate from observing student loan default rates that, while increasing in every sector in 
recent years, have consistently been highest among students in the for-profit college sector.
2 
The government has policy levers at its disposal that can determine which students receive 
financial aid and at which schools. Students’ access to federal financial aid depends, in part, on their 
own financial resources and family socioeconomic characteristics. For example, some federal 
financial aid programs, such as Pell Grants and subsidized student loans, are means tested, such that 
only students demonstrating financial need have access to the aid. However, perhaps less well 
known is that students’ access to financial aid also depends on the program eligibility of the 
institution they attend. In fact, it is the colleges and universities that serve as the disbursement 
conduit for most federal financial aid. Students attending an ineligible institution cannot benefit 
from the largest federal financial aid programs even if they are otherwise individually eligible.  
In this paper, I consider policies that regulate which institutions can disburse federal 
financial aid, with a particular focus on the use of student loan debt and repayment rates as measures 
to hold institutions accountable for their use of federal aid programs. The discussion has relevance 
to the recently proposed “Gainful Employment-Debt Measures” rules, but also to other provisions 
                                                 
2 Author’s calculations based on cohort default rate data from the U.S. Department of Education, available at: 
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr2yr.html. 3 
 
in existing regulations. These policies attempt to safeguard taxpayers against the misuse of public 
funds and to protect students from potentially risky human capital investments. Although aimed at 
institutions, the policies have important implications for individual access to college, particularly for 
students in some demographic groups. This is because penalized institutions cannot disburse federal 
aid to students, limiting some students’ availabile financial resources and possibly students’ ability to 
attend certain schools. The challenge faced by policymakers is to create policies that both support 
access to higher education through financial aid and promote the efficient use of public funds. 
The Higher Education Act of 1965 and its subsequent amendments dictate that institutions 
that provide a “program of training to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized 
occupation” can be eligible to disburse federal aid if they meet a myriad of requirements.
3 Recent 
rulemaking has invoked this clause to motivate the addition of criteria to narrow which institutions 
and programs of study are eligible to disburse aid, and policymakers have taken advantage of the 
ambiguous interpretation of “gainful employment” in these efforts. In particular, recently debated 
rules do not directly assess employment but instead evaluate institutions based on students’ loan 
repayment. Proposed measures include standards related to the proportion of former students who 
are actively repaying loans and the ratio of loan payments to income.  
These policies raise questions about the ability of institutions to affect students’ loan 
repayment and default behavior. Student loan repayment can be connected to employment and 
income (e.g., Dynarski, 1994). However, pre-college socioeconomic status can be positively related 
to post-college earnings (e.g., Perna, 2003). Moreover, a number of other factors beyond 
employment can affect loan repayment, such as student backgrounds, family endowments, available 
financial resources, and borrowers’ costs and benefits of default (e.g., Gross et al., 2009). Some 
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findings also indicate that student background is a greater determinant of default than institution 
type (e.g., Knapp & Seaks, 1992; Volkwein & Szelest, 1995). 
Using student loan repayment as a basis for holding institutions accountable is further 
complicated because students at greater risk for default are not spread evenly across education 
sectors. Research suggests that for-profit colleges disproportionately serve students that are more 
likely to default, such as those that come from low-income backgrounds or are financially 
independent (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012; Knapp & Seaks, 1992; Volkwein et al., 1998). This had 
led some to claim, therefore, that institutions are being inappropriately punished for being 
“messengers who bring the bad news” about the loan repayment behavior of students they serve 
(Wilms, Moore, & Bolus, 1987).  
 
2. Student Aid, Borrowing, and Loan Default Trends 
 
There are a number of well-publicized trends contributing to the growing concern about 
which institutions should be eligible to disburse student loans. The first is the large and growing 
amount of federal student aid, including grants, loans, and other aid, used to encourage college 
enrollment. Figure 1 displays total federal student aid disbursements over time. Since 1990, federal 
financial aid investment has increased, both because more students are obtaining aid and because the 
amount of aid per student is increasing. In recent years, federal financial aid disbursements have 
exceeded $170 billion annually (Baum & Payea, 2012). 
Given the magnitude of this public investment, there has been increased scrutiny on whether 
these funds are used efficiently and appropriately. The availability of student financial aid can 
improve access to educational opportunities by lowering the direct cost of postsecondary education 
for students. Research consistently demonstrates that lower costs result in increased postsecondary 
education enrollment, though the effects and magnitudes vary across types of students and 5 
 
institutions (e.g., Cellini, 2010; Curs, Singell, & Waddell, 2007; Dynarksi, 2002; Kane, 2003; Leslie & 
Brinkman, 1987; Seftor & Turner, 2002).  
Student borrowing trends, in particular, have garnered a great deal of attention. Government 
estimates indicate that outstanding student loan debt in the United States is approaching $1 trillion 
in 2013, making it the second largest sector of debt in the country behind housing (Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, 2013). Figure 1 also displays increasing total federal loan disbursement over the 
past 20 years. Current estimates indicate that more than one-third of undergraduate students borrow 
federal student loan money, with more than half of public four-year college students graduating with 
debt (e.g. Avery & Turner, 2012; Baum & Payea, 2012). Students are relying more on loans for a 
variety of reasons, including policy shifts away from grants, the rising sticker price of college, and 
difficult economic conditions that have constrained many students’ available financial resources.  
Students with high debt burdens might delay asset-building purchases, such as a home, and 
have limited access to the credit market. Researchers have found that debt can also alter students’ 
post-completion career choices (Field, 2009; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011) and affect social decisions 
such as marriage (Gicheva, 2011). There are also macroeconomic implications to increasing debt 
burdens, as high debt can reduce consumption in the economy.  
Though some have raised the specter of a higher education “bubble,” where rewards 
associated with college do not justify onerous borrowing (e.g., Wasik, 2013), more detailed analysis 
should assuage some of this concern. In the last decade, estimates indicate that per-student 
borrowing has remained relatively level, and cases of extreme debt highlighted in some media 
reports account for only a small portion of college entrants (Avery & Turner, 2012; Dynarski & 
Scott-Clayton, 2013). And, rather than considering student borrowing in isolation, policymakers 
should consider that higher education remains a sound investment for most students. Over the past 
three decades, the average earnings premium associated with attaining a college degree has grown, as 6 
 
has the return to college even when taking into account increasing college costs (Avery & Turner, 
2012). While the heterogeneity of expected benefits of postsecondary education is an important 
consideration for each student, attending college and borrowing at average levels remains a good 
investment for the typical student when considering higher education broadly. 
The use of student loans to encourage college access might be considered attractive to 
policymakers because of the low public cost compared to grant aid which is not repaid. A robust 
student loan market can potentially improve economic efficiency by increasing the supply of highly 
skilled workers (e.g., Avery & Turner, 2012). Without public supports, however, many students 
would likely find it difficult to borrow uncollateralized loan money since human capital investments 
are not as easily financed as physical capital investments. Credit constraints can also be a reason why 
students from high- and low-income backgrounds matriculate at different rates (e.g., Ellwood & 
Kane, 2000). Compared to high-income students, students from low-income families often have 
fewer private resources to defray college expenses. Access to educational credit, therefore, allows 
students to borrow against post-college incomes when earnings are expected to be higher. It should 
be noted, however, that evidence is less conclusive that student loans improve college enrollment 
and persistence like grants do, especially among low-income students (e.g., Campaigne & Hossler, 
1998; Carneiro & Heckman, 2002; Heller 2008).  
Student loan default trends should be more troubling for policymakers, as the costs of loan 
default can be substantial for both borrowers and taxpayers. Default damages an individual’s credit 
profile, which can limit students’ future access to the credit market and impair their ability to finance 
future purchases. Taxpayers absorb costs when borrowers default on federal loan obligations 
because even though in some cases the government can garnish borrowers’ wages and tax returns, 
the government typically will not recover the full costs associated with money lent.  7 
 
Figure 2 displays student loan delinquency rates as compared to the delinquency rates of 
other types of consumer credit, such as housing or auto finance, in recent years. Whereas 
delinquency rates for the other credit types have leveled off or decreased since 2010, student loan 
delinquency rates are still rising. There are many differences that complicate comparisons across 
sectors of credit, such as varying origination requirements, loan terms and characteristics, and the 
typical borrowing age. Nonetheless, the differences are notable.  
When considering federal aid and student borrowing, scrutiny focuses on the for-profit 
education sector. This sector accrues nearly one-quarter of federal aid disbursements, exceeding the 
proportion of enrollment (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012). The relatively poor average financial 
backgrounds of for-profit students can explain at least some of the disproportionate aid use. Media 
and regulatory reports, however, have alleged abuses and fraud by for-profit schools, claiming that 
some colleges are accruing inordinate amounts of federal money without providing sufficient 
benefits to students (e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office,  2010; “For-Profit,” 2012). While 
research is still emerging on returns to for-profit colleges, recent studies indicate that for-profit 
students generate earnings gains that are lower than those of students in other sectors (e.g., Cellini & 
Chaudhary, 2012).  
Figure 3 displays annual federal loan programs cohort default rates (CDR), which measure 
the proportion of former students who default on student loan obligations after starting repayment. 
CDRs have increased since the beginning of the decade nationally and across school types. 
Particularly notable is that for-profit sector default rates are highest in all years and, when comparing 
the default rate from the lowest point in the past decade (2003) to the most recent period (2010), the 
for-profit sector has the largest percentage point increase in CDRs.  
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3. Extant Policies and Proposals 
 
High default rates, particularly in the for-profit sector, have motivated policy initiatives that 
rely on student loan debt measures to limit which institutions are allowed to disburse federal aid. 
These policies relate to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments 
(Title IV), which authorize the largest postsecondary federal financial aid programs. Examples of 
Title IV programs include Pell Grants, federal student aid work-study, and subsidized loans. In order 
for their students to be eligible to receive Title IV resources, each institution must satisfy three 
broad groups of requirements: attain licensing from the state in which it is located, gain accreditation 
by an agency authorized by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and prove compliance with a 
number of provisions “protecting the administrative capacity and fiscal integrity of its funding 
programs” (Congressional Research Service, 2007, pp. 1-2). For example, institutional administrative 
requirements include having adequate staff to support financial aid programs, providing students 
financial aid counseling, and monitoring the academic progress of Title IV program recipients. 
Financial responsibilities dictate that institutions must maintain sufficient cash reserves to repay Title 
IV funds and prove solvency. Other requirements cover diverse topics such as alcohol use and 
campus security policies.  
If institutions fail to meet these administrative and fiscal requirements or have a significant 
change in status, such as an ownership change or merger, they can lose Title IV disbursement 
eligibility. Since financial aid can foster student matriculation, Title IV eligibility can lead to higher 
enrollments and therefore increased revenue earned by institutions. Schools are allowed to receive 
up to 90% of revenue from Title IV funds, and some for-profit institutions obtain a large portion of 
revenues from these sources (e.g., Cellini & Goldin, 2012).  
Other Title IV rules relate to the appropriateness of educational programs, and federal 
policymakers have a record of cautiously regarding programs that differ from higher educational 9 
 
norms. For example, in 1992 Congress enacted the “50% rule” that rendered a school ineligible if it 
offered more than 50% of its courses by correspondence or if more than 50% of its students 
participated in correspondence courses. The 50% rule was enacted largely in response to concerns 
about “diploma mills” that appropriated financial aid funds to indiscriminately send diplomas to 
students without providing real educational programs (e.g., Glass, 1995).
4 In 1994, the ED also 
implemented the “one day rule,” which mandated that Title IV eligible institutions have an academic 
year consisting of at least 30 weeks with a minimum of one day of organized academic activity.
5  
Particularly relevant to recent regulatory efforts are policies that use student loan debt 
repayment behavior to determine whether an institution should be allowed to disburse Title IV 
funds. An existing regulation can render institutions ineligible to disburse Title IV funds if their 
CDRs rise above certain thresholds. Specifically, if CDRs exceed 25% for three consecutive years or 
40% for one year, the institution is subject to loss of Title IV aid disbursement eligibility.
6  
Newly proposed regulations attempt to tighten eligibility even more, with a focus on for-
profit institutions. In 2010, the ED proposed the program-level “Gainful Employment-Debt 
Measures” rules that added three new debt measure requirements for institutions. The first new rule 
requires that at least 35% of former students be in repayment. The second and third measures 
specify allowable debt-to-income ratios; qualifying programs must show typical graduates have 
annual loan payments that do not exceed 30% of their discretionary income or 12% of their total 
                                                 
4 In response to concerns about the rule limiting access to postsecondary education, the ED initiated the Distance 
Education Demonstration Program (DEDP) in 1999 that temporarily allowed a few participants to disburse federal Title 
IV funds to students even if they crossed the 50% correspondence course threshold. Due in part to the success of the 
DEDP, the 50% rule was rescinded in 2006 as part of the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005. 
5 The ED initially allowed alternatively structured institutions to follow a “12 hour rule,” where 12 hours of scheduled 
educational activities signified an academic week. The ED, however, revised regulations in 2003 such that all schools 
must comply with the “one day rule” rather than the “12 hour rule.” 
6 The CDR calculation includes loan default behavior of students within two years of starting repayment (“two-year 
CDR”), and starting with the 2009 federal fiscal year, a new “three-year CDR” calculation includes loan default behavior 
of students within three years of starting repayment.  10 
 
earnings. Under the proposal, if programs fail these requirements for three out of four fiscal years, 
they lose Title IV disbursement eligibility.  
The Gainful Employment rule garnered more than 90,000 comments during the solicited 
response period (Program Integrity, 2011). After a legal challenge, a federal judge vacated key 
measures of the rule, citing the lack of evidence or expert study used to justify the repayment rate 
standard. The ED mounted a legal challenge to reinstate key components of the Gainful 
Employment rules, but has so far been rebuffed, and negotiated rulemaking is ongoing. Some effects 
of the proposal may already be realized, however. One explanation for recent indications of for-
profit enrollment declines (e.g., Blumenstyk, 2012; Hechinger, 2013) is that expected compliance 
with Gainful Employment requirements have caused institutions to be more careful about the 
programs they offer and which students they admit. Increased public scrutiny may also make 
prospective students wary of enrollment in this sector as information about default rates becomes 
more available.  
  
4. Is Student Loan Default a Pre-Existing Condition? 
 
A key issue is whether it makes sense to hold institutions accountable for the loan repayment 
behavior of their students. An important feature of federal student loan programs is that the 
government does not price-ration student loans and instead sets a common interest rate for all 
borrowers. As long as students attend an eligible program, they can borrow federal student loan 
money without an assessment of their individual creditworthiness. In this way, decisions to approve 
and price loans are not based on individual risk of default. Without this system, many students 
would likely face an impaired ability to obtain credit, since they typically do not place collateral 
against debt obligations and often have thin credit profiles. However, this can lead to an extension 
of educational credit beyond what would be dictated by market prices, and some students can obtain 
credit at a rate that does not reflect the true cost of their default risk. Costs associated with student 11 
 
loan programs can be difficult to evaluate (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005), and some 
research suggests that budget estimates understate the true costs associated with default in federal 
student loan programs (Lucas & Moore, 2007). If interest rates are not set high enough to 
adequately capture default risk, the lack of price rationing can transfer default costs to the public.  
The substantial costs of loan default to both taxpayers and students motivate policies such as 
Gainful Employment that attempt to hold schools accountable for the repayment behavior of their 
students. Research supports the connection between lack of employment and student loan default, 
as having a job can provide resources with which to pay student loan obligations (e.g., Dynarski, 
1994; Woo, 2002). Decisions to repay student loans, however, can also involve factors beyond 
employment. Divorce and house price declines are examples of income and asset shocks that may 
impair borrowers’ ability to service their debt. Individuals’ costs and benefits of default can also 
affect repayment decisions. In times of financial distress, instead of paying student loan debt, some 
borrowers may choose to service debt that has more severe default penalties, such as the risk of 
having a house or car repossessed. Ionescu and Ionescu (2012) find that borrowers have the 
incentive to default on student loan debt before credit card debt in an effort to preserve liquidity. 
Concerns about strategic default on student loan obligations, moreover, have manifested themselves 
in policy decisions to prevent student loans from being expunged or reduced through bankruptcy.  
Furthermore, though causal relationships have not been convincingly determined, findings 
from research consistently indicate that student socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are 
associated with default. For example, research points to generally consistent evidence that males 
have relatively higher default rates (e.g., Herr & Burt, 2005; Podgursky et al., 2002) and that default 
increases with age (e.g., Podgursky et al., 2002; Woo, 2002). Students who come from more 
advantaged financial backgrounds can likely rely on greater personal resources or assistance from 
family to help avoid default in times of economic distress. It is reasonable to believe that borrowers 12 
 
who do not enjoy such access to financial resources would be more likely to default in difficult 
economic times. Indeed, research finds that borrowers who come from lower income and lower 
wealth backgrounds or who are less likely to receive help from family are more likely to struggle with 
debt obligations (Baum & O’Malley, 2003; Knapp & Seaks, 1992; Volkwein et al., 1998). Also, 
borrowers with increasing numbers of dependents are more likely to default because of greater 
financial responsibilities (Dynarski, 1994; Volkwein & Szelest, 1995; Woo, 2002). 
As such, while some stark student loan default rate differences are evident across sectors, 
they should be considered in light of dissimilarities among student demographics and socioeconomic 
backgrounds. The for-profit sector serves student bodies with higher proportions of students who 
have characteristics associated with default, including older students, financially independent 
students, students with dependents, and students from less advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds 
who expect little financial help from family members (Cellini & Darolia, 2013; Deming, Goldin, & 
Katz, 2012). Cellini and Darolia (2013) examined financial resources available to students across 
sectors and found that while students at for-profit colleges are borrowing more, they also have the 
fewest financial resources available, a difference which is getting larger over time. Figure 4 is a 
reproduction of a chart from the authors showing trends in expected family contribution (EFC), a 
common estimate of students’ and their families’ financial resources available to pay for college 
costs. Not only do for-profit students consistently have the lowest EFC across sectors, students in 
this sector also had declining or flat EFCs in 2008, compared to increasing EFCs in the public, four-
year and private, non-profit sectors. 
A key question, therefore, is whether students who default at for-profit colleges would 
default wherever they enroll, due to factors beyond institutions’ control. It is not possible, of course, 
to observe this hypothetical scenario. Some studies find evidence of a relationship between type of 
institution and default after controlling for some socioeconomic factors (e.g., Podgursky et al., 2002; 13 
 
Woo, 2002). A contrasting body of evidence appears to suggest that the determinants of student 
loan default are established outside of the institution, and that institutions have high default rates 
because they enroll students who are most likely to default (e.g., Greene, 1989; Knapp & Seaks, 
1992; Volkwein & Szelest, 1995; Volkwein et al., 1998). Monteverde (2000) calls the proclivity of 
default on student loans a “pre-existing condition,” where high default rates at certain institutions 
are a function of students’ characteristics, not an indictment of the educational offerings of schools.  
It should be noted that research that supports beliefs that institutions can or cannot inhibit 
student loan default is incomplete in its ability to inform current policymaking efforts. Many studies 
had limited scopes and did not consider the for-profit sector specifically. New studies that directly 
examine repayment behavior of for-profit students within the recent educational and financial 
landscape are needed.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
Student loan defaults present risks to students and the economy at large. It is therefore 
appropriate for the government to make efforts to limit these risks, to ensure that the public’s large 
investments in postsecondary education are used efficiently, and to safeguard students and 
taxpayers. The regulatory challenge is to pursue these goals without limiting student choice and 
access to education, especially for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Student loans can be a 
tool used to promote access to education, and the government furthers loan availability by not price-
rationing higher-risk students out of federal student loan programs. This approach keeps credit 
prices relatively low for all borrowers regardless of individual default risk. However, this also 
complicates student loan regulation. Some borrowers borrow at rates that do not adequately capture 
their risk of default, and these students appear to be concentrated at certain institutions.  
Current and proposed federal policies generally attempt to avoid limiting individual students’ 
access to financial aid and instead seek to restrict institutions’ disbursement eligibility based on the 14 
 
repayment behavior of their students. Consider that violation of the Gainful Employment rules does 
not simply limit borrowing; it renders students in these programs ineligible for all Title IV financial 
aid, including aid not directly related to borrowing, such as Pell Grants and work-study. By doing 
this, the federal government is using debt repayment outcomes as a sufficient basis to determine 
whether educational programs warrant federal public investment. Policymakers should therefore 
scrutinize whether limited measures are independently adequate to assess educational quality and, if 
so, whether debt repayment is the appropriate standard. 
Because student loan default can be costly to students and the public, policymakers may 
view comprehensive federal aid ineligibility as an acceptable penalty for poor loan repayment 
outcomes. Conclusions from research give reason for caution with this assessment, as studies do not 
conclusively establish a causal link between student loan default and institution type but consistently 
find that default related to certain student characteristics. Students with those characteristics are 
concentrated in for-profit schools, leading opponents of regulations that penalize schools with high 
default rates to argue that it is not fair to hold institutions accountable for student behavior that is 
beyond the schools’ control (e.g., Guryan & Thompson, 2010).  
If institutions have limited ability to affect default, then encouraging students who are likely 
to default to attend other institutions may not actually benefit students or taxpayers. Such students 
may still default on their loans, but their negative outcome will be diluted among a better performing 
student pool. Financial aid will shift away from schools that predominantly serve low-resource 
students toward those that serve students with more advantaged socioeconomic statuses. Other 
students may not attend college altogether. This may lead to fewer loan defaults, but also to more 
students who miss opportunities to enhance their economic prospects through postsecondary 
education and training. 15 
 
Perhaps the more important question, however, is not whether there is evidence that 
colleges influence default rates, but whether we should expect colleges that receive public funds to 
improve the debt repayment behavior of their students. Large sums of public money are being used 
to subsidize education and increase revenue at private colleges. Therefore, challenges associated with 
the measurement of default should not preclude efforts to promote socially beneficial behavior by 
students and institutions, nor should they absolve for-profit colleges from the responsibility of 
demonstrating a return to the taxpayer investment.  
Furthermore, decisions that determine which institutions can disburse federal financial aid 
have important implications for colleges and students; therefore care should be taken to assess 
potential intended and unintended consequences of rules. A concern about holding schools 
accountable for students’ loan repayment behavior is that some schools could strategically attempt 
to achieve compliance by not admitting or discouraging attendance from students who are at higher 
risk of default. Institution-level financial aid availability can also uniquely affect the enrollment and 
application behavior of students. In the absence of aid, some students may simply transfer to other 
educational programs. Capacity constraints of lower-cost public institutions may hinder some of this 
transfer, especially in high-demand fields and in states with budget shortfalls. Other students may 
only have the ability to attend certain schools because of geographic proximity or convenient class 
schedules. Indeed, increased enrollment at for-profit colleges has been attributed to streamlined 
programs and accessible delivery mechanisms such as online learning. If aid is not available at these 
schools, some students may not be able to attend other schools, and may forgo higher education 
altogether.  
Darolia (2013) finds enrollment declines of approximately 12–16% at for-profit and two-year 
institutions because CDR threshold violations nullified their ability to disburse federal aid. Still 
unknown is what proportion of deterred students attended other institutions and the “quality” of 16 
 
such institutions. At least some of these likely students did not enter higher education altogether, 
though still to be determined is whether attendance at schools judged to be poorly performing is net 
beneficial as compared to not attending at all. Because nontraditional, minority, and low-resource 
students are concentrated in for-profit schools that are more likely to lose Title IV eligibility, policies 
that punish schools that fail student outcome measures are likely to disproportionately affect the 
very students that many financial aid programs are designed to serve. 
In other words, institution-level eligibility policies should be recognized as not only 
influencing at which schools students enroll, but also higher education access. If limiting some 
individual access to higher education is believed to be acceptable in return for reducing student loan 
defaults, then there may be some merit in exploring policies that consider creditworthiness and 
manageable debt standards as part of decisions related to the amount individual students can 
borrow. Debt-to-income ratios are commonly taken into account before credit is offered in other 
contexts (e.g., housing) to determine whether borrowers can obtain credit and how much they can 
borrow. While we typically do not know students’ post-graduation incomes prior to college entry 
when students obtain most loans, Gainful Employment proposals are already asking for average 
program-level debt-to-income ratios to be calculated based on outcomes of completers. 
Consideration of prudent borrowing amounts prior to matriculation may proactively limit students’ 
unmanageable debt burdens and lower risks of default. 
Another recommendation is to enhance the information available to students so they can 
make informed decisions about where to attend and how much to borrow. While not a panacea, 
information can play a critical role in student decision making, as students’ borrowing choices are 
connected to the decision of whether and where to attend college. Before deciding if and where to 
attend college, students should compare the present value of expected benefits, including college 
earnings premiums, against the present value of costs, including tuition, fees, and forgone earnings. 17 
 
The calculation of costs and benefits is not simple. Future benefits are difficult to forecast because 
the ability of a student to obtain a job is uncertain and research indicates heterogeneous returns to 
education across college types, college majors, careers, and student abilities (e.g., Arcidiacono, 2004; 
Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg, 1999). Research on the returns to for-profit colleges, moreover, is still 
in developing stages. Evidence suggests that average earnings gains may be lower at for-profits than 
in other sectors (Cellini & Chaudhary, 2012), but forgone earnings may also be lower with shorter 
and more streamlined programs (Guryan & Thompson, 2010). Projecting costs such as forgone 
earnings can also be challenging, and when deciding to borrow, students must be able to understand 
relatively complicated financial concepts such as amortization, interest, and deferment. 
Students need to be armed with the appropriate information to make prudent decisions. 
High student loan default rates at institutions should serve as a powerful signaling mechanism about 
expected returns for prospective students, but even though the ED publicly posts cohort default 
rates on its website, it is not clear whether students are actually aware of and use this information. 
Policymakers should also not assume that all students will understand complicated calculations of 
expected costs and benefits, or that standardized measures of average net benefits will adequately 
represent each individual’s preferences and constraints. Even if students are able to understand and 
process the range of possible benefits of higher education, they still may not be likely to believe that 
they will earn less than average. And, as with other complex decisions, those who are the least 
financially literate will be most likely to be confused or misled.  
Therefore, public investment would be well spent in an effort to improve the information 
made available to students about aid and college options, and to find clearer and more effective ways 
to present that information. Policymakers should also consider who is empowered to provide this 
information and the source of funding. For example, Cellini & Darolia (2013) find that for-profit 
students are most likely to talk with financial aid officers, but less likely to talk with family and 18 
 
friends about financial aid. College financial aid officers may have competing incentives to both 
serve their employer and help students. Empowered high school counselors may be able to serve a 
relatively impartial role, as could independent advisors who are not affiliated with specific colleges. 
Finally, while not unique in policymaking, significant decisions about how to curb student 
loan defaults and evaluate school performance are being made in the absence of evidence or studies 
to adequately guide such determinations. Therefore, there is great need for researchers to continue 
efforts to analyze the causes of student loan default and the contribution of schools to this behavior. 
Also needed is a better understanding of the private and social returns to for-profit college 
programs, and if and to where students transfer when their preferred college is not eligible to 
disburse federal financial aid. With empirical answers to these questions, researchers will be able to 
better inform policymaking on inevitable reforms related to the use of student loan debt measures in 
financial aid regulation.  19 
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Figure 1: Federal Aid and Loan Disbursements ($M) 
 
Source: Baum & Payea (2012). Constant 2011 dollars used. 
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Figure 2: Percent of Balance 90+ Days Delinquent by Loan Type 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013) 
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Figure 3: Two-Year Cohort Default Rates 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of Education, 
available at: http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr2yr.html 
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Figure 4: Expected Family Contribution 
 
Source: Reproduced from Cellini & Darolia (2013), data from the National Postsecondary 
Student Aid Study. Constant 2008 dollars and survey weights used. 
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